On Morality

Ed: This started out as a short commentary on Pinker's article. Instead I spent the majority of my day today rephrasing what he wrote. So take heed - there's quite a bit of overlap.

By way of Foonyor: Steven Pinker has an excellent article in The New York Times Magazine entitled, "The Moral Instinct." Pinker explores a few aspects of morality and our conception of it - is it innate? Is it something we learn? Are some of us genetically predisposed to be positive moral agents? What can we learn from the amoralization and moralization of certain topics? Is our political and social discourse heavily biased by an automatic moral association?

Pinker makes several excellent points. His exploration of the moral instinct - that automatic revulsion most of us get when confronted with the possibility of performing what are commonly regarded as immoral acts (harming others, being deceitful, etc.) - is fascinating. Does it make sense that we are genetically programmed with some sort of moral code? There appears to be a lot of evidence in support of it. Functional MRI tests of the brain show that there is a conflict between certain regions of the brain in test subjects when they are presented with dilemmas in which their action would directly cause harm to an individual. The conflict arises between that region which coldly calculates the moral weight of a situation - strict utilitarianism would always say that it is morally correct to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people (or, as a corollary, inflict the least possible amount of harm) - and that region which is believed to be involved in emotions about other people. A third region actually appears to register this conflict, so that on some level we are aware of this emotional/rational struggle. ("Well, it makes sense to sacrifice one man to save five but can I really bring myself to kill him?")

There is also very strong empirical evidence for some sort of basic universal moral code, as people everywhere generally regard certain actions as morally wrong (murder, rape, stealing, etc.). These can be divided into five broad themes, or spheres of moral influence: harm, fairness, community (or group loyalty), authority and purity. These themes keep popping up across cultures and carry moral weight within our own intuitions. Pinker talks about how these moral spheres even make sense from an evolutionary standpoint as a deeply rooted genetic moral code.

Of course a problem arises when we are forced to "juggle the spheres." If there is a universal morality, how can it be so varied across cultural lines? Pinker submits that while the moral themes are universal, the weight given them varies widely from culture to culture. This ranking of the spheres' moral value can be so deeply ingrained as to suggest that even questioning the ranking within one's own culture represents a moral corrosion. This is one reason why everything from racism to political discourse to religious strife are such nearly intractable problems - literal moral revulsion occurs when certain possible moral conflicts arise. This automatic moral trigger renders reasonable debate impossible before it even begins.

Pinker goes on to discuss specifically how a genetic predisposition toward being a positive moral agent - i.e., a good person - can actually be an evolutionary boon. He says that a reputation for fairness can only be acquired under strict scrutiny by actually being fair, and that such people can enjoy the reciprocity that comes with that reputation. However, he also adds this, which I think is perhaps the nicest line in the essay:

At least some agents evolve to be genuinely high-minded and self-sacrificing — they are moral not because of what it brings them but because that’s the kind of people they are.

Of course not everyone has evolved with a moral code (or one to which he adheres), and this presents yet another problem: if our moral experience of the world is biologically coded, then what of our distinction between right and wrong? Is this nothing more than how we see different colors? Is our concept of morality as a metaphysical ideal useless or impractical? This gives way to a dangerous and debilitating moral relativism - "Well it's bad for us, but since it's ok for you...it's ok." Moral judgement would no longer be imbued with any authority or power.

There are a few ways around this. One is religion. Pinker debunks this with a Platonic logical argument, but religion doesn't work simply because people do not believe in the same religion (or any at all). If we are working with different sets of rules from the get-go, we will not agree how the game should be played. Pinker suggests moral realism, a theory that moral truths exist. We are born with an innate moral sense and through the development of moral reasoning, we are forced to come to certain conclusions based on the nature of this moral reality. This moral theory can become quite complex. Oddly enough, it is very similar to mathematics. There are certain absolute mathematical truths which appear to simply exist naturally. From these basic truths (2+2=4) we can acquire sophisticated mathematical reasoning, from basic addition and subtraction to trigonometry, calculus, and even more advanced stuff that I cannot even fathom.

This notion of morality appeals to me quite a bit. There are kernels of moral truth out there, but given the complexity of the human experience, it requires a robust moral compass to navigate the treacherous waters of our common moral sea. We can only arrive at a complete moral system by testing it in a logical proving ground. This might be a tad absolutist for some, but Pinker goes on to point out that two features of our reality align the moral compasses of rational agents to act morally: 1) It is generally in our best interest to cooperate and prosper, rather than exist in a state of antagonism and violence. 2) The interchangeability of moral perspectives. If I maintain that I am arguing for the morally correct solution in a given situation, I have to convince you that if the positions were reversed, you would agree with my reasoning. The only commonality across all people everywhere is an appeal to rationality as the basis for all moral precepts. It is the ultimate arbiter - the vast majority of mankind possesses it; it transcends race, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status, and all other differentiations.

It is not surprising that this theory appears in succinct and eloquent form in the Golden Rule, and elsewhere in slightly different versions throughout the history of moral philosophy.

So we seemingly have some innate moral sense. And the value of moral reasoning cannot be discounted. What can we take away from this? An appreciation of this can help us try to understand even the most morally repugnant actions of others. While this does open the door to a certain moral relativism, it also frees us from our moral shackles to engage in open debate on topics ranging from domestic social issues (abortion) to worldwide problems (Islamofascist terrorism). Pinker claims that rather than debunking our concept of morality as some exalted metaphysical ideal, the science of our moral instinct will allow us to advance and refine our moral systems, in an attempt to improve this imperfect world in which we live.

And I find myself agreeing with him.